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Preliminary Report on Campaign Financing 
I. BACKGROUND AND SUMMARY 
The Commission on Government Integrity is investi-
gating the adequacy of New York's "laws, regulations and 
procedures relating to campaign contributions and campaign 
expenditures. 111 Although the Commission's work on this 
subject is not yet complete, its members have already 
reached certain firm and unanimous conclusions, which can be 
succinctly summarized: New York's campaign financing laws 
and procedures are so inadequate and outmoded2 that they 
1 t' d h Execu ive Or er No. 88.1, Paragrap II. 5, (April 21, 
1987) 
2
one of the nation's most experienced campaign 
financing administrators, and a nationally recognized expert 
in the field, Kent Cooper, summed up New York's standing 
among the states when it comes to analyzing and 
disseminating campaign contribution and expenditure 
information: 
"If you want to be a leader ... you have got to be out 
front, you have got to be thinking of new ideas, you have to 
have a budget, you have to have the staff to do it, you have 
to have the support of the legislature to do it. I don't 
think that New York has done very much at all. I would 
probably put New York where New Jersey was about fifteen 
years ago. 
* * * 
"New York has a long, long way to go. I don't think it 
is anywhere near being a leader. You are not even in 
(Footnote Continued) 
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undermine public confidence in the honesty and integrity of 
government, and will remain a public embarrassment unless 
and until they are reformed. 
This preliminary report on campaign financing 
provides the Governor and the public with the Commission's 
earliest conclusions and preliminary recommendations, which 
are an essential first step to accomplish the necessary 
reform of the c~mpaign financing system. 
The Commission's ongoing investigations have 
revealed patterns of large campaign contributions often 
shrouded in secrecy, leaving at least the impression that 
they are given in return for government benefits. 
To the extent that New York's laws and procedures 
require campaign financing disclosure at all, they require 
too little and too late, and they permit some filings to be 
made in locations too remote from the particular campaign 
for easy scrutiny of the local citizenry and press. current 
(Footnote Continued) 
consideration in that regard." State of New York, Commission 
on Govenment Integrity, Hearings on Campaign Financing, 
Transcript ("Hearings Tr.") pp. 229-230 (October 21 1987). 
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New York law permits disclosure of individual contributors 
without disclosure of their employers or business affilia-
tions. Disclosure of corporate contributors can be made 
without disclosure of affiliated or subsidiary corporations. 
Moreover, under current law and procedures, recipients of 
many campaign expenditures are never disclosed. As a 
result, the central purpose of New York's disclosure 
requirements -- informing the public in a timely fashion of 
the nature and extent of the sponsorship of candidates for 
public office -- is defeated. 
The agencies charged with enforcement of the law, 
the New York State Board of Elections and the various local 
boards including the New York City Board of Elections, do 
not have the resources to deal adequately with campaign 
financing. These agencies serve only as repositories for 
the campaign disclosure forms filed with them. They have 
almost none of the data from those filings on computers, and 
they do not compile or analyze the data or disseminate it to 
the public. As current law permits, the State Board of 
Elections discards the disclosure forms after five years 3 
3New York Election Law Section 14-108(3) 
1978). 
(McKinney 
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and keeps none of the information from the discarded forms, 
in statistical form or otherwise. As a result, public 
access to vital information and meaningful enforcement of 
New York's campaign financing laws is all but impossible. 4 
Further, while New York law technically contains 
proscriptions on the amounts individuals can contribute to 
campaigns, those amounts are so high (~, more than 
$40,000 for statewide general elections) that it is 
ludicrous even to refer to them as limits. And considering 
the disclosure weaknesses and lack of enforcement, it is 
abundantly clear that there are no practical restraints on 
the amounts which can pour into the campaign coffers of 
elected officials. In order to keep up with or discourage 
potential adversaries, those officials often obtain large 
amounts from wealthy contributors, many of whom do business 
with the government. The public then perceives that large 
campaign contributions are the ~ pro ~ for the 
government business. 
4In fact, the inadequacy of information available from 
the State Board of Elections, combined with the weaknesses 
in the disclosure laws, have hampered Commission 
investigations _and have caused postponement of certain 
recommendations, such as those involving public funding of 
state legislative campaigns. 
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The Commission's ongoing investigations illustrate 
these weaknesses in New York's campaign financing practices. 
The Commission's investigation into a recent upstate town 
council election demonstrates the disastrous inadequacy of 
current disclosure -requirements and the ineffectiveness of 
the State Board of Elections. This continuing investigation 
has revealed that, unbeknownst to the citizens of that town, 
outside investors played a decisive role in the election by 
funneling huge contributions through a political action 
committee ("PAC") and a state political committee to support 
the campaigns of candidates who were sympathetic to the 
investors' proposed construction project in the town. 
The Commission is also investigating the secret, 
so-called "housekeeping" accounts of the two major political 
t . 5 par ies. The Commission is not yet in a position to make a 
recommendation on this subject because this complicated 
investigation is far from complete. However, the Commission 
has found evidence that these political party accounts have 
been used to hide sensitive contributions. There is also 
evidence that these accounts are then used to benefit 
candidates, also without the knowledge of the voters. 
5
see p. 24 n. 19 below. 
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The Commission is also investigating whether 
government contracts are awarded to large campaign contri-
butors and, if so, how and why. 
The Commission's recommendations are also grounded 
in a thorough study of this complex field. The Commis-
sioners have reviewed New York's current law and the 
significant literature in the field and have benefited from 
public testimony of experts, including officials from 
enforcement agencies around the nation, and from 
communications with scores of interested persons around the 
State. 
In formulating its recommendations, the Commission 
has fully considered the delicate balance necessary to 
achieve true reform. Any change brings about a reaction and 
experience in the campaign financing field has shown that no 
matter how well intended, reforms may cause unexpected 
reactions. For example, amendments to the federal election 
campaign laws in the 1970s have undeniably caused a 
proliferation of PACs and a new set of controversies. 
Similarly, unless great care is taken, certain 
reform measures may increase the advantages which incumbents 
already enjoy. For example, if contribution limits, 
-7-
expenditure limits, or public funding amounts are set too 
low, challengers may be unable to raise or spend enough 
money to overcome the advantages of incumbency. Or, if 
disclosure requirements are too technical or burdensome, 
t.hey could favor candidates with the best staffs of at-
torneys or accountants. 
With investigations in progress, the Commission 
cannot now submit a full and final list of conclusions and 
recommendations. The Commission is 
investigations, 
identify and 
and initiating 
highlight further 
others, 
continuing 
so that 
the deficiencies 
existing framework and issue comprehensive, 
these 
it may 
in the 
final 
recommendations and other interim reports. For now, the 
Commission urges that the following steps are the least that 
must be taken, and taken soon, to restore some semblance of 
public confidence in New York's electoral system. 
II. SUMMARY OF MAJOR RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Creation of a new, independent, adequately 
funded Campaign Financing Enforcement Agency with extensive 
powers to implement and enforce the campaign financing laws 
and regulations. 
-8-
B. Full, detailed and timely disclosure of all 
campaign contributions and expenditures. 
c. 
limits and 
corporations, 
Drastically 
prohibitions 
labor unions, 
the government. 
reduced campaign contribution 
on direct contributions from 
and those doing business with 
D. Optional public funding of elections 'for the 
statewide off ices and removal of state law barriers to 
public funding for local elections. 
E. Carefully prescribed expenditure limits to 
accompany any public funding scheme. 
III. RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. Independent Campaign Financing Enforcement Agency 
A separate, permanent New 
Financing Enforcement Agency ( "CFEA") 
administer and enforce the campaign 
York State _Campaign 
should be created to 
financing laws. The 
agency should have six commissioners (not more than three 
from any political party) whom the Governor appoints, with 
the advice and consent of the Senate, to staggered terms, 
-9-
after nomination by a commission patterned after the state 
commission which nominates candidates for the New York Court 
of Appeals. 6 
The nominating commission should be comprised of 
four appointees of the Governor, not more than two from any 
political party, and one appointee each of the speaker of 
the assembly, the temporary president of the senate, and the 
minority leaders of each house of the legislature. The 
nominating commission should include representatives of 
leading civic groups and business and religious leaders. It 
should be charged with nominating three candidates for each 
of the six commissioner positions on the CFEA, and three for 
each vacancy thereafter. 
The nominating commission should strive to make 
nominations to the CFEA which will help make the agency 
non-partisan and independent of the statewide officials and 
the legislature. Ultimately, the CFEA should be comprised 
of citizens who have demonstrated integrity and commitment 
to civic affairs, representing a broad cross-section of the 
6
see New York Const. art. VI, Section 2(c)-(f) . 
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electorate. The chairman should be full-time and the other 
commissioners part-time, reimbursed on a per diem basis. 
The CFEA should have a significant budget which 
allows it to perform all of the functions listed below from 
off ices throughout the State and which is automatically 
increased for inflation. 7 One of the most important func-
tions of the agency should be to promulgate clear and 
concise regulations so that all those affected understand 
their responsibilities. Of equal importance, the agency 
should be required to computerize immediately all data from 
campaign disclosure filings and to compile this information 
so that it may be readily understood by, and disseminated 
7The Federal Election Commission ("FEC"), recognized as 
an exemplary agency for compilation and dissemination of 
data from campaign disclosure filings, has a $14 million 
annual budget and receives 40,000 filings annually. While 
the total number of campaign disclosure filings throughout 
New York is not available, the State Board estimates that it 
will receive 9, 000 next year, and the New York City Board 
between 3, 000 and 4, 000. It is likely, therefore, that 
there are at least 20,000 annual __filings statewide, or half 
the number received by the FEC. Given that the new state 
agency would have substantial start-up costs, an 
appropriation in its first year of between seven and nine 
million dollars would be required to put the agency on a par 
with the FEC. Such an appropriation would be approximately 
half of the 1987-1988 recommended appropriation for 
relocating the remaining state offices from the World Trade 
Center. State of New York, Executive Budget, April 1, 1987 
- March 31, 1988, A33. 
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to, the public and the press during the campaign. Original 
filings should be made with the CFEA. In addition, each 
filing that contains a contribution or expenditure affecting 
a local election should also be filed with the appropriate 
county off ice so that voters and the local press are 
promptly informed of the financing of their local elections. 
The agency should have authority to issue advisory 
opinions to candidates, their committees, and affected 
citizens. It should have full investigatory and enforcement 
powers, including the authority to issue subpoenas, conduct 
audits of political committees, and refer criminal viola-
tions to the appropriate District Attorneys. Knowing and 
willful violations of the campaign financing laws should be 
treated as class A misdemeanors and fraudulent activities as 
felonies. The CFEA should, in addition, have the authority 
to impose significant fines for disclosure and contribution 
and expenditure limitation violations. 
The CFEA should attempt to resolve disputes by 
settlement. Investigations, whether initiated upon the 
complaint of a private party or the CFEA itself, should be 
confidential and disclosed to the public only upon comple-
tion. Candidates and committees should have an opportunity 
to express their positions during the course of the agency's 
-12-
investigation, as well as upon its completion, and the 
agency should be required to state fully its reasons for 
acting. 
The CFEA should be required to act upon complaints 
within 90 days and should have the authority to assess costs 
for baseless complaints made for the purpose of engendering 
publicity. The agency should be required to produce an 
annual report to the Governor and the Legislature and should 
make proposals for changes in the law to promote its more 
effective functioning. 
The Commission strongly recommends that the 
functions enumerated above reside in a new, independent 
agency and not additionally burden the Board of Elections. 
The experience of the campaign financing experts consulted 
by the Commission is that the Board of Elections' 
responsibilities are and should remain those relating to the 
ballot process. 8 The Commission's own inquiri~s strongly 
support this conclusion. 
8Frank P. Reiche, former chairman of both the 
Jersey and federal campaign financing agencies, made 
point emphatically: 
New 
this 
(Footnote Continued) 
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It is not happenstance that the Commission's first 
recommendations concern the CFEA: they are of paramount 
importance. Although public funding, disclosure reform, and 
contribution limit reform are essential and, perhaps, more 
dramatic issues, they are reforms which all depend on reform 
of the enforcement mechanism. Without an independent, 
vigorous agency which has both the ability and reputation 
for effective enforcement, public funding of campaigns will 
be ineffective and disclosure requirements and contribution 
limits will continue to be ignored and circumvented. In 
short, unless there is an independent enforcement agency, 
New Yorkers will not realize the benefits of other campaign 
financing reforms, however well-considered and wide-ranging. 
(Footnote Continued) 
"My feeling and conclusion that it would be best to 
have a single agency charged with campaign finance 
disclosure responsibility, that is simply because of the 
nature of the work involved. 
"Contrast it, if you will, with what the State Board of 
Elections does. They do extremely important work but 
entirely different. They are involved in insuring that 
everything goes well on Election Day, that we all vote, and 
if that ever becomes tarnished, we are all in trouble and we 
know it. 
"But what you' re talking about in terms of campaign 
financ[ing) is very sophisticated investigation, and I think 
that's best left to one specific agency, if we are talking 
about the financing of elections." Hearings Tr. pp. 407-408 
(October 22, 1987). 
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B. Disclosure Requirements: Full and Timely Disclosure 
The importance of full and timely disclosure can 
not be overestimated. As Justice Brandeis stated: "Publi-
city is justly commended as a remedy for social and in-
dustrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of 
disinfectants; electric light the most efficient police-
man. 119 Thus, campaign financing disclosure requirements 
serve a number of compelling public interests. As the 
United States Supreme Court observed, they "deter actual 
corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by ex-
posing large contributions and expenditures to the light of 
publicity. 1110 Of equal importance, disclosure requirements 
reveal candidates' financial supporters and thus enable 
voters to assess candidates more intelligently. 
1. Current Disclosure Laws and Practices Are 
Utterly Inadequate 
New York's existing disclosure requirements must 
be dramatically improved to inform the public of the true 
nature and extent of candidates' support. In contrast to 
9L. Brandeis, Other People's Money, 62 (Nat'l Home 
Library Foundation ed., 1933) 
10 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) 
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other jurisdictions, our disclosure requirements barely 
provide the people of this State with the illumination of a 
candle, much less of the sun. For example, patterns of 
contributions from businesses and other entities cannot 
readily be detected because, among other reasons, a 
contributor's place of principal employment or relationships 
between subsidiary or affiliate corporations need not be 
identified on any disclosure form. 
Other weaknesses in the laws pertaining to dis-
closure of campaign expenditures keep New Yorkers in the 
dark. Although Election Law Section 14-102(1) requires 
political party committees to disclose the purpose of 
campaign expenditures, there is no express requirement that 
they identify the candidate or candidates on whose behalf 
the expenditures are made. Nor has the Board of Elections, 
which has the power to promulgate regulations supplementing 
the disclosure requirements of Article 14, required dis-
closure of such information. Thus, current campaign filings 
are replete with "disclosures" by political committees 
reporting only that they expended large sums for the purpose 
of "consul ting" or "postage" in a particular locale. The 
electorate does not and cannot know whether these large 
disbursements were intended to benefit particular candidates 
and, if so, which ones. 
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Ultimate recipients of expenditures are often 
hidden from public view. The Commission's investigations 
reveal that in some cases when political committees make and 
report large payments to an entity and identify the purpose 
of the payment as "consulting fees," in fact the consultants 
are acting as general contractors and using part of the 
funds disbursed to them to pay subcontractors for campaign 
services. The involvement of these subcontractors is hidden 
from the public. 
Existing disclosure weaknesses also prevent the 
public from obtaining timely information concerning the 
amount of money spent on particular candidates. The Board 
of Elections disclosure form does not require political 
committees to disclose campaign liabilities, despite Elec-
tion Law Section 14-102, which requires those committees to 
report both campaign expenditures and liabilities in their 
pre-election filings. Rather, the forms require disclosure 
only of "unpaid bills incurred" during the filing period. 
Thus, political committees can and do arrange for vendors 
not to submit bills until the close of the last pre-election 
filing period, and thereby avoid disclosure before the 
election of large campaign liabilities. The result, again, 
is a woefully ill-informed electorate. 
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Under current law, political committees must file 
their final pre-election report 11 days prior to the elec-
tion .11 The report, however, must only be current as of the 
fifteenth day prior to the election. 12 Thus, current law 
consigns voters to a position of near total ignorance in the 
often crucial, final two weeks of campaigns. 
This general rule has one commendable exception: 
contributions in excess of $1,000 received during this 
period must be reported within 24 hours of receipt. 13 For 
several reasons, however, this requirement does not signifi-
cantly enlighten voters. 
First, under current law campaign financing 
disclosure statements are deemed to be timely filed if 
mailed within the prescribed time period. 14 Thus, if the 
final pre-election statement is mailed on the eleventh day 
11New York Election Law Section 14-108(1) (McKinney 
Supp. 1986); 9 NYCRR Section 6200.2(a) (1985). 
12New York Election Law Section 14-108(2) (McKinney 
1978). 
13New York Election Law Section 14-108(2) (McKinney 
1978) . 
14New York Election Law Section 14-108(6) (McKinney 
1978) . 
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before an election, it is timely filed. The statement, 
however, may take several days to reach the state or county 
Board of Elections. In the interim, of course, the public 
remains ignorant. Moreover, even the 24-hour notice 
requirement for last-minute contributions in excess of 
$1, 000 can be met by mailing a statement disclosing such 
contributions the day after they are received . Accordingly, 
the Board of Elections may not receive statements reporting 
large contributions made during the last week of a campaign 
until after the election, when it is obviously too late for 
voters to react. And, even if the Board of Elections 
receives them timely, the limitations of the Board are such 
that the filings will often still not be readily available. 
Second, there is no requirement under current law 
that large expenditures or liabilities (as opposed to 
contributions) be reported on a 24-hour basis during the two 
weeks before the election, although large expenditures and 
liabilities are often made and incurred during that time. 
Indeed, elections can and sometimes do turn on campaign 
expenditures and liabilities (such as for radio and tele-
vision) made or incurred in the final phases of campaigns. 
Such large expenditures and liabilities can be made or 
incurred either by candidates (through their committees) or 
by independent political committees. Either way, voters 
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should know immediately the amounts given and the identities 
of those providing such support. With regard to candidates 
specifically, the amount of money they spend can itself be a 
factor of considerable importance to voters. 
Further, current New York law does not require 
political advertisements or literature to contain dis-
closures of even the identity of the person or committee 
paying for the advertisements or literature. Nor does New 
York law require that such advertisements or literature 
reveal whether they are authorized by the candidates on 
whose behalf they are made. In the upstate town discussed 
earlier, out-of-town investors financed a barrage of 
political advertisements and literature (including radio 
advertisements, brochures and other mailings) during the 
final stages of a political campaign. These advertisements 
and literature made no mention of those responsible for them 
or of the issue with which the investors were particularly 
concerned. Rather, the advertisements and literature urged 
voters to vote for the candidates supported by the investors 
on the basis of the candidates' positions on other issues. 
Not until after the election of most of those candidates did 
the fact and extent of the out-of-town financial sponsorship 
begin to emerge. 
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Other aspects of 
disclosure practices must be 
current campaign 
addressed. Modern 
financing 
campaign 
financing techniques make those who successfully solicit 
large contributions perhaps even more valuable to candidates 
than those who make large contributions. Astute campaign 
managers will form a network of well-connected persons who, 
in addition to making their own large contributions, will 
draw on business, social or other contacts to collect 
additional large contributions. Those who are thus able to 
raise large amounts, of course, receive political credit for 
both the contributions they make and those they collect. 
Yet, under present law, the identities of these solicitors 
(and "bundlers" or couriers) remain unknown. current law is 
seriously deficient in this respect, because only the most 
naive could fail to recognize that public officials who owe 
their electoral success to these individuals will, at the 
very least, appear to be indebted to them and the interests 
with which they are affiliated. 
Currently, a single candidate may be supported by 
more than one political committee, each of which may or may 
not expressly be authorized by the candidate. As a result, 
voters must refer to a number of disclosure statements, some 
of which may be filed locally and others in Albany, to 
determine the identities of all the candidate's supporters 
-21-
and the total amount of the candidate's expenditures. 
Similarly, a single committee may support more than one 
candidate, and each candidate may or may not expressly 
authorize the committee to act on his or her behalf. As a 
result, the electorate's ability to discover a candidate's 
supporters and expenditures can become an even more dif-
f icul t task. Moreover, the prevalence of multi-candidate 
committees can make and has made enforcement of New York's 
contribution limits a far too arduous task. 
2. Recommendations 
This disi::ussion d~monstratP.s that the following 
reforms in disclosure laws are critical: 
For all contributions of over $100, the 
contributors' place of principal employment, by name and 
address, 15 as well as home address, must be disclosed, so 
that patterns of contributions may be fully analyzed by 
computer and reported. 
15
when a contributor works for a subsidiary 
corporation, the identity of the parent corporation should 
also be disclosed. 
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Ultimate recipients of campaign expenditures 
must be disclosed by name, address, and date. The specific 
purpose of each expenditure or liability, its amount, and 
the candidates it is intended to benefit must also be 
disclosed. 
Just as current law imposes record-keeping 
obligations on political conunittees16 and requires all 
political committees, including PACs and political party 
committees, to have one official depository and treasurer, 17 
each candidate should have only one campaign committee with 
one official depository and a treasurer charged with 
responsibility for compliance with the law. 
Filings by all candidate committees should be 
made on a monthly basis in election years, and quarterly in 
all other years. A party committee or PAC supporting more 
than one candidate should be required to file in accordance 
with the campaign cycle of each of the candidates it sup-
ports. 
16New 
14-122 (1) I (2) 
York Election 
(McKinney 1978). 
Law Sections 14-118 (3): 
17 New York Election Law Section 14-118 ( 1) (McKinney 
Supp. 1986). 
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After the last monthly filing in the month 
preceding the election, there should be a report filed ten 
days prior to the election. The report should be current as 
of the twelfth day prior to the election and should be 
deemed timely filed only if it is received by the CFEA by 
the close of business on the tenth day prior to the elec-
tion. 
During the twelve days prior to the election, 
each contribution received which equals or exceeds $1, 000, 
and each expenditure made or liability incurred which equals 
or .exceeds $5,000, should be reported to the CFEA within 24 
hours of the receipt of the contribution, the making of the 
expenditure, or the incurring of the liability. 18 These 
24-hour statements, too, should be deemed timely filed only 
if received by the CFEA within 24 hours of the triggering 
contribution, expenditure or liability. The Commission 
recognizes that the precise amount of many liabilities will 
not be determinable when first incurred. With respect to 
such liabilities, a reasonable estimate of the amount of the 
liability should suffice. To encourage reasonable 
18 l' . Sp itting 
avoid disclosure 
prohibited. 
contributions or expenditures in order to 
immediately before the election should be 
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estimates, the Election Law should expressly provide that 
the estimated amount of an indeterminate liability is not 
admissible to prove liability in any lawsuit brought by the 
vendor against the political committee. 
Any advertisement of whatever nature (~, 
newspaper, television, radio, billboards, posters, brochures 
and mailings) should conspicuously disclose the name of the 
person or committee paying for the advertisement and whether 
the advertisement has been authorized by the candidate or 
the candidate's committee. 
Committees should disclose intermediaries who 
solicit and deliver contributions. These bundlers should be 
defined to exclude those who deliver fewer than five 
contributions in a year, and contributions from immediate 
family members should not count toward that tota1. 19 
19The Commission 
"housekeeping" exemption. 
Election Law states: 
is currently examining the 
Section 14-124 ( 3) of New York's 
The filing requirements and the expenditure, 
contribution and receipt limits of this 
article shall not apply to monies received 
and expenditures made by a party committee or 
constituted committee to maintain a permanent 
headquarters and staff and carry on ordinary 
(Footnote Continued) 
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The Commission recognizes that these disclosure 
proposals constitute a dramatic departure from present 
requirements. They are, nevertheless, essential to meaning-
ful reform. There should be no concern that they will have 
deleterious consequences. They are, after all, in large 
part modeled on the federal system, which has received 
uniform recognition as an effective model, as well as other 
more modern state campaign financing systems. 
At the same time, the Commission recognizes that 
in smaller localities, such as villages and small towns, 
volunteerism and civic participation in small campaigns 
should not be discouraged by filing requirements which may 
be too complex or onerous. Accordingly, the CFEA should be 
permitted to promulgate simplified forms for village and 
(Footnote Continued) 
activities which are 
purpose of promoting 
cific candidates. 
not for the express 
the candidacy of spe-
Not requiring disclosure of contributions "received" for 
such ill-defined purposes seems literally to invite manipu-
lation. Commission investigations to date indicate that the 
invitation has been accepted on more than one occasion. 
Recommendations on this subject must await completion of 
these investigations. 
-26-
town candidates and their committees and to exempt entirely 
campaigns which will receive or expend less than $2,00o. 20 
c. Contribution Limits Must Be Drastically Reduced 
A rational scheme of contribution limits should 
seek to strike a balance between two competing goals: one, 
deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption which 
ineluctably flows from very high limits, and two, permitting 
contributions in sufficiently large amounts both to respect 
First Amendment values and to permit meaningful challenges 
to be waged against incumbents. 21 
20The CFEA should also permit exemptions from 
disclosure requirements for unpopular splinter parties which 
may be subject to harassment. 
21The Commission is investigating allegations from 
certain recent elections that public funds were used to 
benefit the campaigns of incumbent officials. We recognize 
that it is difficult to draw lines in this area, but we are 
confident that New York State, like other jurisdictions, can 
accommodate the tensions between the need to curtail the 
improper use of public funds for campaign purposes and the 
need to protect elected officials' ability to communicate 
with the public on matters of legitimate public concern. 
The Commission expects to make recommendations to maximize 
the likelihood that incumbents will not improperly use 
taxpayers' monies for purely political advantage. 
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Measured by these standards, New York's present 
contribution limits are seriously deficient. Indeed, it is 
hypocritical even to assert that New York's laws and regula-
tions effectively impose contribution limits. The reality 
is that the exceptions and loopholes with which our present 
laws are riddled engulf the ostensible limitations which 
exist, if at all, in the text of New York's statutes. 
First, annual limits are much too high: $150,000 
per person per year for political purposes within the 
state. 22 Second, even this limit is more illusory than 
real. Under the "housekeeping" exemption just mentioned, 
individuals, partnerships, unions, and companies can all 
contribute without any limitation at all if the contribu-
tions end up in a "housekeeping" account. Under one 
interpretation of this exemption, moreover, even corpora-
tions, otherwise prohibited from contributing more than 
$5,000 per year, can make unlimited contributions to 
"housekeeping" accounts. Third, current law expressly 
provides that there are no limits -- other than the $150,000 
annual limit on the amounts which can be given to 
22New York Election Law Section 14-114(8) (McKinney 
1978). 
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political party committees, including state, county, city or 
other local "constituted" committees of a political party. 
Fourth, current law implicitly permits huge contributions to 
other multi-candidate committees. So long as a committee 
supports numerous candidates and does not request and 
receive their authorization, it can, as a practical matter, 
receive up to $150,000 from any contributor. 
Moreover, the 
dividuals' contributions 
purported limitations on 
to particular candidates 
in-
are 
themselves absurd. For example, candidates for New York 
City-wide office may legally accept a $50,000 contribution 
from an individual for a primary and another $50,000 
contribution from the same individual for the general 
election. Thus, a husband and wife can contribute a total of 
$200,000 to one candidate. Candidates for statewide office 
may legally receive similarly large amounts. 
Finally, these limits are described, in part, by a 
formula involving multiplication of a certain amount (~, 
25 cents) by, for example, the number of voters in the 
district. This scheme adds an unwarranted level of complex-
ity, promotes public confusion about amounts which may be 
contributed, and falsely suggests that the setting of limits 
proceeds on some reasoned mathematical basis. 
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The setting of campaign contribution limits is not 
a science. There are two criteria, however, which should 
be, but have not routinely been, included in any contribu-
tion limit scheme: first, simplicity requires that the 
limits be expressible in round numbers; and second, fluctua-
tion in the value of money requires that any limits be 
adjusted periodically to reflect inflation (or deflation). 
Thus, all contribution limits should be tied to an ap-
propriate inflation index and automatically increased and 
rounded upward to the next $100 for every percentage in-
crease that would result in an increase of $ 5 O . O 1. Every 
ten years the Legislature should review the limits to 
determine whether they are still appropriate. 
1. Individual Contributions 
The Commission believes that the following sets 
forth a proper range of limits on individual contributions 
from which the legislature should choose: 
i. Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Attorney 
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General, and Comptroller of the State of New York: 
$2,500 to $4,000 per election. 23 
ii. State Legislature: $1,500 to $2,000 per election. 
iii. Mayor, President of the City Council, and 
Comptroller of the City of New York: $2,500 to 
$4,000 per election. 
iv. All other city and county offices: $1,000 to 
$2,000 per election. 
v. Town, village and other local offices: $500 to 
$1,000 per election. 
The Commission views these limits as appropriate 
whether or not public funding is permitted or authorized. 
To the extent that the higher ranges are used, 
some consideration should be given to limiting the total 
contributions made to any candidate by members of a single 
23
"Per election" denotes a separate contribution limit 
for a primary election, a general election, and any run-off 
election. 
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household. Any proposal on this score, however, may face 
significant legal challenges and may be at odds with the 
realities of modern families. 
Consideration should be given to a provision, 
based on a California proposal, 24 which would allow candi-
dates to accept a specified amount of "seed money", i.e., 
first contributions, in individual contributions which are 
subject to higher limits. For example, a statewide candi-
date might be permitted to accept his or her first contribu-
tions up to a limit per contribution of $25, 000 from an 
otherwise permissible source until the candidate has raised 
a specified amount to enable the campaign to get under way, 
e.g., $100,000. 25 This would counter the potential effect 
of the lower contribution limits, which might, under certain 
circumstances, make it very difficult for challengers to 
start campaigns. 
24
california Commission on Campaign Financing, "The New 
Gold Rush: Financing California's Legislative Campaigns," at 
232 (1985) 
25
of course, if a public funding system were in place 
(see Point III D. below), these contributions would not be 
entitled to be matched by public funds. 
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2. Political Party and Political Action Committees 
Political parties should and, indeed, must con-
tinue to play a significant role in the process. Therefore, 
the Commission recommends that the ceiling on contributions 
to political parties be higher than the one on contributions 
to candidates. While, once again, there is no bright line, 
the Commission recommends that contributions to political 
parties which have fielded candidates on the ballot in 
statewide elections be limited in the range of $10, 000 to 
$15,000 per person per year and that all other contribution 
limits, whether to PACs or political party committees which 
have not placed candidates on the statewide ballot, be 
limited to $5,000. 
Contributions 
committees affiliated 
to 
with 
county, city, 
a statewide 
or other 
political 
local 
party 
committee should be aggregated with contributions to the 
statewide committee. Transfers between political committees 
(party committees or PACs) should be deemed contributions to 
the recipient committee and subject to the same limits as 
other contributions to that committee. This will have the 
effect of channelling contributions from political commit-
tees directly to candidates rather than indirectly through 
other committees. 
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In order to prevent circumvention of the contribu-
tion limits by the expediency of contributing to a 
proliferating number of formally distinct committees and to 
insure that no single contributor is perceived as exerting 
undue influence, the Commission recommends an aggregate 
limit on all political contributions of $25,000 per person 
per year. Thus, if Contributor A contributed $15, 000 to 
either party's state committee, he or she could contribute 
in that year only an additional $10,000 to all other 
candidates or committees. or, Contributor B could make one 
$5,000 contribution to a statewide committee and be limited 
to another $20, 000 in that year to all candidates. As 
noted, contribution limits to candidates or candidates' 
committees should be calculated on an election cycle basis 
and not on a yearly basis. 
Just as contributions to political parties should 
be encouraged, contributions by political parties to candi-
dates or. their committees should also be encouraged in order 
to strengthen further the political parties. But current 
law goes too far. It provides that there are no limits on 
the amount of contributions parties can make to their 
candidates. Indeed, for the purposes of New York's 
contribution limits, political party committees and their 
constituted committees are deemed not to be contributors at 
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a11. 26 That provision should be replaced by one permitting 
a political party to make contributions to a candidate of up 
to five times the limits for individual contributors, but 
which imposes no limit on the amount the party may spend on 
voter registration and get-out-the-vote drives which are 
carried on without reference to particular candidates. 
3. Corporations, Membership Organizations, and 
Government Contractors 
Finally, the Commission recommends that corpora-
tions, labor unions and other unincorporated membership 
organizations, and those entities which contract with the 
government be prohibited from making direct contributions. 27 
Rather those entities should be permitted to create and pay 
for the administrative expenses of PACs. Those PACs could 
solicit contributions from executive or administrative 
personnel or shareholders of the corporation, or members of 
unions or other membership organizations. Direct solicita-
tion of an employee by his or her superior should be 
26New York Election Law Section 14-114(3) (McKinney 
Supp. 1986). 
27Those who do business with the government of a 
particular locality would be prohibited from making 
contributions to candidates for office in that locality. 
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prohibited, and significant penalties for coercion of 
campaign contributions should be enacted. 
The present system, which permits corporate 
contributions in the aggregate of $5,000 per year but which 
allows related corporations to have separate limits permits, 
in effect, virtually unlimited corporate contributions and 
results in the improper intrusion of corporate wealth into 
the political system. 
Similarly, contributions to government officials 
or candidates by those who contract with the government 
necessarily raise at a minimum an appearance of impropriety. 
The Commission has specifically investigated the enforcement 
of a recent legislative effort to respond to this problem in 
New York City and has concluded that it is inadequate 
primarily because it does not prohibit contributions from 
government contractors, but only limits the amounts which 
they can give during certain time periods, and it is 
probably unenforceable because of record-keeping 
weaknesses . 28 
28
rn 1986, the Election Law was amended to prohibit 
those whose business transactions with New York City require 
(Footnote Continued) 
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4. Other Contribution Recommendations 
Contribution limits should apply not only to cash 
and checks, but also to in-kind contributions, loans (except 
(Footnote Continued) 
approval by the Board of Estimate from making contributions 
or loans in excess of $3,000 to a member of the Board six 
months before or twelve months after the Board officially 
considers the transaction. Election Law Section 
14-114 (9) (a). The same prohibition applies to partners, 
corporate officers, and certain corporate shareholders whose 
partnership or corporation has business pending before the 
Board. 
The City appears unable to monitor or enforce this 
prohibition; in any event, it has not done so. First, the 
Board of Estimate does not warn those who have business 
which requires Board approval about the law's restrictions 
on campaign contributions. Second, the Board of Estimate 
had not, until last month, complied with its obligation 
under the new law to inform the Board of Elections of the 
names of those to whom the new restriction applies. 
Al though the law expressly requires the Secretary of the 
Board of Estimate to send to the Board of Elections a 
monthly list identifying those who have had business before 
the Board, it was not until late November 1987, after this 
Commission had begun to make inquiries about the enforcement 
of the seventeen-month old law, that the Board of Elections 
first received such a list from the Board of Estimate. 
Finally, because the Board of Elections does not computerize 
the campaign contribution disclosure statements it receives 
from the various candidates and political committees, it is 
in no position to determine whether those whose names appear 
on the monthly Board of Estimate lists have complied with 
the $3,000 contribution ceiling. To match up the names on 
the Board of Estimate lists with the names of contributors 
who appear on the campaign disclosure statements is, in the 
words of the Executive Director of the New York City Board 
of Elections, a "herculean task", one which the Executive 
Director cannot undertake until the records are 
computerized. 
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those from banks in the ordinary course of their business), 
guarantees, and anything of value with the exception of 
volunteer activities and certain minimal exemptions for 
activities performed in the home. Contributions from 
spouses and other members of the candidates' families should 
be treated as any other contribution. 
Gifts and honoraria have sometimes been used to 
circumvent contribution limits; there should be some limits 
on those which should relate to individuals' annual total 
contribution limits . 
D. Public Funding For Statewide Elections 
Public funding of candidates for statewide off ice 
is currently in place in a number of states, most notably 
New Jersey, Michigan, Minnesota and Wisconsin, and at the 
local level in Tuscon, Arizona, Seattle, Washington and 
Sacramento County, California. 
The experience in those jurisdictions demonstrates 
that if properly constituted, public funding allows in-
creased opportunity for candidates to participate in the 
political process, lessens the influence (real and apparent) 
of individual contributions, and permits candidates to spend 
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their time campaigning rather than raising money. At the 
same time, experience shows that public funding requires 
significant administration, auditing, and compliance efforts 
by the enforcement agency, and may also require significant 
additional expenditures of public money. 
It is not clear how much popular support there is 
for public funding. Studies have indicated that when voters 
are given an opportunity to check off a space on their tax 
returns in order to finance a political campaign, participa-
tion has not exceeded 40 percent, and has much more often 
been in the 15 to 20 percent range, 29 even though there is 
no additional cost to the taxpayer. 
Public funding is often used to secure expenditure 
limits, and thereby theoretically to diminish the cost of 
campaigns. If expenditure limits are set too low, however, 
the natural advantage of incumbents from superior name 
recognition and the like eliminates any real possibility of 
competition. Further, public funding of primary candidates 
can be extremely costly and can result in the expenditure of 
29 . . Hearings Tr. p. 18 (October 21, 1987) (testimony of 
Dr. Herbert E. Alexander). 
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public funds on candidates who have no real possibility of 
electoral success. Also, because money attracts money, 
public funding can have the effect of accentuating 
incumbents' advantage. 
After careful consideration of the pros and cons 
of public funding and the record compiled by the Commission 
to date, the Commission is in a position to make a limited 
number of recommendations concerning that subject, and the 
counterpart subject, expenditure limits. As discussed 
below, additional recommendations must await completion of 
ongoing Commission investigations and studies. 
The Commission recommends public funding of all 
statewide elections with funds raised by a check-off on the 
state income tax set between two and four dollars per 
return. 30 In the primary, there should be a system of 
matching small contributions. In the general election, a 
grant should be given to each major party candidate (with 
proportionate amounts based upon voter registration to any 
30 d' t th k t Accor ing o e New Yor S ate Department of 
Taxation and Finance, approximately 7, 500, ooo returns are 
filed each year. Therefore, a four dollar check-off with a 
20 percent check-off rate would yield six million dollars 
per year. 
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minor party fielding statewide candidates and whose candi-
date received more than 50, 000 votes in the last elec-
. ) 31 tion . These grants should encourage participation by 
qualified candidates who might otherwise hesitate to chal-
lenge an incumbent and should help insure that there is at 
least some competition even in years such as 1986, when the 
public perception was that the incumbent Governor was likely 
to prevail by a large margin. Even if victory appears 
assured, encouraging the loyal opposition serves to further 
the public debate. 
With respect to local campaigns, including New 
York City, other cities, counties, towns and villages, the 
31The Commission urges that its recommendations be 
enacted as soon as possible and that this public funding 
recommendation, in particular, be effective for the next 
statewide election. The Commission recognizes that the 
transition to a public funding system presents many 
technical issues, such as the use that may be made of 
contributions received under the former system. The 
Commission will be formulating recommendations for an 
appropriate transition based on study of other states' 
experiences. One possible analogy is also presented by 
Federal Election Commission regulations governing the 
transfer of funds from the committee of a state candidate 
who wants to use those funds to run for federal office. 
11 C.F.R. Section 104.12 (1986 ed.). This regulation 
prohibits the candidate for federal office from spending 
funds received at any time in a manner which violates 
federal law (~, corporate contributions or individual 
contributions of more than a $1,000). 
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State should at a minimum remove any obstacles to the 
adoption by a local government of public funding of 
campaigns. Thus, to the extent that it might be argued that 
New York City requires state legislation before the City 
Council can authorize public funding (an argument on which 
the Commission takes no position) the State should remove 
any existing obstacles so that the City Council in its 
wisdom may pass a public funding law should it choose to do 
so. The same treatment should be accorded to all other 
municipalities. 
However, any public funding ·1aw adopted by a 
locality should be subjected to scrutiny to insure fairness 
and specifically to insure that expenditure limits are not 
set too low to inhibit competition or allow for an unfair 
division of public funds. Thus, before it becomes ef-
fective, any local public funding law should comply with 
specific criteria enumerated by the Legislature. 
Furthermore, with respect to loc~l campaigns, in 
the event that the local governing body does not pass a 
public funding law, the State should provide a public 
initiative mechanism by which citizens of the governmental 
unit can call for a referendum for public funding based upon 
a model law which the CFEA recommends. 
amounts 
If 
must 
public funds. 
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there is to be public 
be set for a candidate 
funding, threshold 
to be eligible for 
These amounts should vary depending on the 
level of government involved, and contributions should be 
counted for the purposes of meeting the threshold amount 
only up to a limited amount for each contribution. There 
should be a specific list of permissible uses of public 
funds and a requirement that unexpended funds be returned to 
the treasury. 
The Commission intends to investigate and study 
further public funding of campaigns in order to prepare 
additional recommendations. The Commission will determine 
appropriate threshold contributions, matching ratios, and 
grant amounts for public funding of statewide elections and 
how much that system will cost. The Commission will also 
study contribution and expenditure patterns in past state 
legislative campaigns in order to determine whether public 
funding of those contests is appropriate and, if so, the 
Commission will propose a framework for such a system. The 
Commission will also be considering appropriate criteria for 
local public funding laws. These and similar questions must 
await further Commission consideration. 
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E. Expenditure Limits 
Although there are unresolved constitutional 
questions in this area, Buckley and its progeny have made 
clear that expenditure limits are, in general, unconstitu-
tional unless made a condition of participating in an 
optional system of public funding. 
As noted above, one of the reasons for adopting 
public funding is to provide the legal basis to impose 
expenditure limits. As also noted, such limits must be 
fairly set in order to prevent increased advantages to 
. umb t 32 inc en s. 
In order to enhance competition, the Commission 
recommends that any expenditure limits be set in the first 
instance at no less than 75 percent of the largest amount 
spent in each of the last three elections for the particular 
32Robert M. Stern, the Director of the California 
Commission on Public Financing put it succinctly: 
"Expenditure limits, though, if adopted, have to be high 
enough .... if you adopt low expenditure limits, you're going 
to reduce competition and hurt challengers .... if the 
expenditure limits are high enough, it will encourage 
competition and help challengers." Hearings Tr. p. 49 
(October 21, 1987) 
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office (recalculated for inflation), and that, in the 
future, that expenditure limit be keyed to an appropriate 
inflation index. (Statewide, New Yorkers must be satisfied 
with using data from the last two elections, because the 
State Board of Elections maintains filings for only five 
years 3 3 and keeps no summary data ·once it destroys those 
filings. As a result, expenditure information for campaigns 
before 1982 is not available from the Board.) 34 
Expenditure limits should exclude costs relating 
to compliance with campaign financing laws. Otherwise, 
complaints of violations may be filed solely to cause an 
adversary to spend money responding to those complaints. 
Any candidate accepting public funds should be 
required to agree to the expenditure limits set for the 
33 New York Election Law Section 14-108(3). 
34The Commission plans to propose more specific 
expenditure limits when it has analyzed available data. One 
problem that can be noted now is that when using past 
expenditures as a guide to setting future 1 imi ts, 
aberrations from past norms, such as a gubernatorial 
candidate's expenditure of more than $16 million in the 1982 
campaign, should not be permitted to skew the data because 
that would result in unreasonably high limits. 
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particular campaign, and to limit expenditure of his or her 
own funds to the applicable individual contribution limit. 
Committees of political parties should be deemed 
to be affiliated with the candidate for spending purposes so 
that political committees' expenditures on behalf of a 
candidate would be included in that candidate's expenditure 
limit. Get-out-the-vote and voter registration drives, 
which are not for the benefit of specific candidates, should 
not be included. 
One of the most irksome problems with expenditure 
limits is the regulation of independent expenditure commit-
tees. The benefits of expenditure limits can be easily 
off set by weal thy indi victuals acting with each other, but 
independently of the candidate they support, to purchase 
media time or print advertising. Various proposals have 
been made to regulate this activity, but none has been 
deemed effective to date. Certain of the Commission's 
disclosure and contribution limit proposals (sections B. and 
c. above) are designed in part to deal with this issue. 
Now pending before the United States Senate is a 
proposal which would give a candidate supported by public 
funds additional funds in the event independent expenditures 
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were made for his or her opponent. 35 An unintended effect 
of such a proposal might be for the supporters of candidate 
A to prepare an independent expenditure advertisement for 
candidate B which is actually detrimental to candidate B, 
knowing that such an advertisement would result in addi-
tional public funds for their own candidate. The Commission 
believes that an effective and constitutional limit can be 
placed on independent expenditures only by limiting 
contributions to political committees, which usually 
undertake such activity, as the Commission recommends (at p. 
32 above). 
A related problem is raised by a candidate who 
does not opt for public funding and is therefore not 
governed by expenditure 1 imi ts. Such a candidate has a 
potentially enormous spending advantage over a candidate who 
does accept public funding. In order to encourage the 
acceptance of public funding, the Commission recommends that 
the following system be adopted on a trial basis, perhaps 
with its own sunset provision to insure its demise if it 
proves ineffective: In the event that a publicly funded 
candidate's opponent declines public funding and (a) exceeds 
35The "Boren Bill", S.2, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987). 
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the expenditure limit which applies to the publicly funded 
candidate or (b) either (i) uses in excess of a specified 
amount of his or her own personal funds (perhaps $50,000 for 
the statewide races) for the campaign, or (ii) independent 
expenditure advertisements costing in excess of that amount 
are made on behalf of the candidate who has not accepted 
public funding, with the result that he or she exceeds the 
expenditure limit, then, in any of these three cases, the 
expenditure limit of the publicly funded candidate would be 
increased to the extent of the adversary's expenditures 
which exceed the expenditure limit. In the primary, the 
publicly funded candidate would then be permitted to receive 
additional matching contributions, and in both the primary 
and the general election, that candidate would be permitted 
to raise by special contributions, having a much higher 
limit (again, approximately $50, 000) or spend from his or 
her own funds amounts up to 100% of the amount expended by 
the adversary from his or her own funds or by independent 
groups. Such special contributions could still only be made 
by persons otherwise eligible to contribute (which would, 
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under the Commission's proposals, exclude corporations, 
36 
unions, and government contractors). 
Thus, for example, assume that candidate A 
declined public funding and spent $200,000 of his own funds 
and also exceeded the expenditure limit. Candidate B, who 
had accepted public funding, would ordinarily be limited by 
the contribution limit in the amount he could spend from his 
own funds. Under this proposal, he would then be able to 
make an additional $150,000 contribution ($200,000 minus the 
$50, 000 he already presumably made) from his own funds or 
raise up to an additional $150,000 from eligible 
contributors who could contribute up to $50,000 each. This 
plan would diminish the advantage of the wealthy candidate 
who might otherwise decline public funding, or the candidate 
with reason and ability to exceed the expenditure limit, 
without the expenditure of an additional large amount of 
public funds. 
36A similar proposal has been made by the 
Commission on Campaign Financing. See California 
on Campaign Financing, "The New Gold Rush: 
California's Legislative Campaigns," 227 (1985). 
California 
Commission 
Financing 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
There can be no dispute that the e~isting system 
lacks the capacity for proper enforcement, disclosure and 
compilation of data in a timely fashion. Similarly, there 
can be no dispute that contribution limits are too high and 
that disclosure is inadequate. 
While debate is more intense with respect to 
public funding, the Commission believes that the limited 
proposals it has made at this time represent an equitable 
accommodation of competing considerations and square with 
the realities of political campaign financing it has so far 
uncovered. 
The Commission feels strongly that local option on 
public funding should be preserved and obstacles to it 
removed. Local legislatures should at least have authority 
to spend public monies for campaign funding if they believe 
it is a proper priority for their governments. And the 
public should be able to petition its government to install 
such an option if the citizens believe it appropriate. 
The Commission is pleased to provide the Governor 
with these preliminary proposals, and intends to continue 
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its investigations and study of the issues relating to 
campaign financing. 
These preliminary recommendations reflect the 
unanimous view of the members of the Commission that New 
York can not abide the status quo and that drastic changes 
in the campaign financing system are needed. 
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